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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN THE STATES
REVISITED
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-
neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master-that's all."
-Through the Looking Glass
There exists today, noticed by relatively few of the practicing bar,
a basic dichotomy in the judicial interpretation of a constitutional tenet
of great historical and contemporary importance. The term "due process
of law" is generally considered by both laymen and members of the
bar to be a fundamental, constitutional protection against arbitrary
seizure of or interference with life, liberty or property. But that there
are radically differing views as to the content of that term and as to the
vitality and significance of its application in our present state of social,
economic and political development is unfortunately not so well known.
The spirit and even the words of the due process clause are not
indigenous to the Constitution of the United States. This idea has been
known to civilized man since he first realized that his social welfare
demanded the placing of some bounds upon the exercise of arbitrary
power. It was the basis of the appeal of the Apostle "aul to his Roman
captors in which as a Roman citizen he demanded to be tried according
to Roman law.' Its Latin equivalent per legem terrae, appeared as a
vital provision of the Magna Charta forced upon King John by the
barons attempting to curtail the unlimited exercise of the King's sovereign
power.2 It first appeared formally in America in the Plymouth Colony
Fundamentals of 1636 which, after prohibiting the deprivation of "Life,
Limb, Liberty, Good Name or Estate," except by authority of some
recognized law, concluded by stating:
And none shall suffer as aforesaid, without being brought
to answer by due course and process of law.3
Almost these exact words were incorporated into our own federal
Constitution one hundred and fifty years later.4
Like all effective, lasting measures for the circumscription of
irbitrary power, the due process concept has always been cast in general
:erms, thus providing the elasticity necessary to adjust to changing politi-
cal theories and social conditions. This essential generality also makes
I XXII, The Aacts 25-29.
2 Magna Charta
3 MoRISON, S.E., FREEDOM IN CONTEMPORARY SocIETY, Little, Brown and
Company, Toronto, 1956, pp. 15-17.
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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possible, however, differing interpretations as to its meaning and re-
quirements. These requirements of due process have varied greatly
throughout the course of American constitutional history.5 It is a fact
that today there is not one due process concept but two. There is federal
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; there is state
due process as determined exclusively by the state courts in interpretation
of such clauses in their own constitutions.6
In an article published in 1950, Professor Monrad G. Paulsen
examined four fields of judicial review of legislation: price regulation,
control of competition by licensing, prohibition of business methods, and
the regulation of labor unions and labor practices.' From cases arising in
these fields, Professor Paulsen concluded that the judiciaries of many
states still clung fervently to the tool of substantive due process to upset
regulatory legislation on the basis of an independent judicial determina-
tion of the statute's efficiency and desirability.' By 1937, however, the
Supreme Court of the United States, which had once religiously followed
the substantive approach, had discarded the application of due process in
this way, retaining only vestiges of the former substantive content by
requiring a showing of merely a rational relationship between means and
ends of regulatory legislation.9 This transition in the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause was not emu-
lated by all the state courts. These courts, being the supreme arbiters of
their own constitutions, were free to retain the federally-abandoned con-
cept of substantive due process and to continue to require a demonstration
of a "real and substantial" relationship between the legislative means
and ends.10
This bifurcated approach to the role of due process results in two
5 Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RE-
CONSIDERED 167 (1938).
G See e.g. OHIO CONST. art. I, §16 (1912).
7Paulsen, The Persistence of Substance Due Process In The States, 34
MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
SId. at 92-3.
9 The turning point of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
due process is generally considered to have been Nebbia v. New York 291 U.S.
502 (1934), although in the wage regulation field it did not come until West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397 (1937). The pre-Nebbia doctrine is typified
by the renowned decision of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) invalidating
wage and hour restrictions and which was overruled by the West Coast Hotel
case. Post-Nebbia decisions are graphically exemplified by Daniels v. Family
Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949), which seemingly gave the
states a carte blanche for economic experimentation.
10 Some state courts did, however, follow the doctrine enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court. The Vermont court in Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp. v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A. 2d 271 (1954), held that the due process
test of its state constitution should be the same as that provided by the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also People
v. Ryan, 101 Cal. App. 2d 927, 226 P. 2d 376 (1951); Dayton Co. v. Carpet,
19571
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
very different treatments of economic regulatory legislation in the various
courts of the nation. The effect of the policy of judicial self-abnegation
in the review of legislation pursued by the United States Supreme Court
and emulated by some state courts is to strengthen the Brandeis thesis
that the states are "laboratories for social and economic experimentation."
The Supreme Court has said, in essence, that the states are free to adopt
through their legislatures any policy in the field of economic regulation
which they may deem desirable. Statutes reflecting such public policy
will only be upset by the Supreme Court as violative of federal due
process if they are so unreasonable as to preclude the Court from as-
certaining any rational connection between the permissive goal and the
selected means to achieve it. The implications of this for constitutional
decision are readily underlined by the fact that no economic regulatory
legislation has been upset by the Supreme Court since 1937.1
Those state courts following the substantive due process approach
have not, on the other hand, been inclined to follow the federal doctrine
of self-abnegation in this field, an admittedly difficult psychological feat
for any court. These state courts continue to insist, as did the pre-1934
federal judiciary, that legislative enactment of state public policy be
tempered by what the state courts believe to be desirable, effective and
proper. The final decision on what is to be public policy is by this view
a result of judicial declaration, and not of the vote of the state's
popularly-elected representatives.
Professor Paulsen in his 1950 article condemned the refusal of the
more conservative state courts to follow the lead of the Supreme Court
and give freer and more effective voice to the desires of the electorate as
reflected in the acts of their chosen representatives. It is the aim of this
comment to re-examine Professor Paulsen's thesis in the light of post-
1950 cases to determine whether this definite schism in the interpretation
and application of the due process clause by the state and federal courts
still exists. For the sake of continuity and greater clarity, this comment
will be limited to the same field selected by Professor Paulsen, although
many illuminating examples of this problem can be found in other areas
of the law.1
2
Linoleum & Resilient Fl. D. Union, 229 Minn. 87, 39 N.W. 2d 183 (1949); dis-
senting opinion in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 65 N.V. 2d
410 (1954).
11 This approach has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
reference only to economic matters. In the area of civil rights legislation, the
Court has pursued the substantive approach, requiring a real and substantial
nexus between means and permissible ends. Many of the state supreme courts
are more prone to reverse this application, i.e., to use rational tests in civil rights
cases and substantive tests in economic due process situations. For an example of
this in a state court see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Schaner in Sei Fujii
v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).




Since the West Coast Hotel case in 1937,13 the Federal Constitution
has proven no bar to the states in fixing minimum wages. This decision
reflected the drastic change, responding to the upsurge in the labor
movement and the great depression, from the former attitude of the
Supreme Court, which had been expressed in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 4
that the power to fix prices was an inherent attribute of property itself.
It followed the new doctrine of the Nebbia case of 1934'5 which had
held that the phrase "affected with the public interest" meant "no more
than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the
public good."'"
In 1941, Olsen v. Nebraska7 declared that a state need not justify
its actions merely because prices were being regulated. Post-1950 Su-
preme Court cases have adhered to the West Coast Hotel and Olsen
reasoning, and are best evidenced by the type of reasoning found in
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, even though it was not a case of
price regulation."i Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in that case,
stated:
Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a
superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to
decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public
welfare. . But the state legislatures have constitutional
authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled
to their own standard of public welfare; they may within
extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor
field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not
violated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling
federal laws are avoided. 9
Among other cases, Justice Douglas relied on and cited W'Vest Coast
Hotel, Nebbia and Olsen.
State supreme courts have not, in many instances, been prone to
follow the lead of the Supreme Court in this field. Instead, they have
persisted in delving into the propounded legislative purpose of price fixing
legislation, demanding a "real and substantial" connection between the
permitted ends and the means utilized to achieve those ends. Especially
vulnerable to this type of attack have been the "non-signer" provisions
of the state Fair Trade Acts. Although many states have yet to pass on
these provisions, among those which have approximately one-half have
2d 691 (1955), 17 OHio ST. L.J. 146.
13 XVest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra note 9.
14273 U.S. 418 (1927).
15 Nebbia v. New York, supra note 9.
'Old. at 536.
17313 U.S. 236 (1941).
18 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
'
9 1d. at 423. Accord, Berman v. Parker, 348, U.S. 32 (1954).
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held them unconstitutional as violative of state due process.2" A cursory
examination of these cases clearly reveals a strong adherence to pre-
Olsen doctrines. The Arkansas court affords a prime example. In
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors21 the
court refused to enjoin the defendant from selling the plaintiff's trade-
marked anti-freeze at less than Fair Trade prices. The court held the
non-signer provision violative of the state and federal constitutions' due
process, declaring its right to be the final arbiter despite the contentions
of the state legislature. Demanding a "real and substantial" connection
between means and ends, the court favorably cited and followed 11
Am. Jur. 1077:
'The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to
the public health, safety, or welfare does not itself bring that
statute within the police power of a state, for there must al-
ways be an obvious and real connection between the actual
provision of the police regulation and its avowed purpose and
the regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted to accom-
plish the end sought to be attained . . .' (Emphasis added.) 22
Also heavily relied upon was Justice McReynolds vigorous dissent in the
Nebbia case.
While many state courts have struck down the non-signer clauses
)f state Fair Trade Acts as either a violation of state due process or an
anlawful delegation to private persons of price-fixing powers, the ma-
jority of states have upheld the remainder of these acts. This has been
done for the avowed purpose of protecting the manufacturer's "property
right" in the trademarked article. But in 1955 the Georgia Supreme
Court nullified its act completely as a violation of due process.2" The
court tersely rejected the General Assembly's finding that the Act was
to protect the property right of the trademark and held it was an illegal
attempt to fix prices. Speaking as if Nebbia and Olsen had yet to be
decided, the court confessed:
We are convinced that any findings of fact in conflict with
what has been held in this opinion would be an attempt by the
General Assembly to find a fact that does not exist, and, of
20 McGraw Electric Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.
2d 608 (1955) ; Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distributors,
224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W. 2d 455 (1955); Shakespeare Company v. Lippman's Tool
Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W. 2d 268 (1952) ; Aegus Cameras,
Inc. v. Hall of Distributors, Inc., 343 Mich. 54, 72 N.W. 2d 72 (1955); Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P. 2d 139 (Colo. 1956) ; Miles Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954) ; Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic
Co. v. Schwegman Bros. G.S. Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956); Grayson-
Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd. 209 Ga. 613, 75 S.E. 2d 161 (1953).
21224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W. 2d 455 (1955).
22 Id. at 566.
23 Cox v. General Electric Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E. 2d 514 (1955).
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course, no court is bound by that sort of finding of fact by a
legislative body. 2
4
Thus, the state courts continue their boycott of the United States
Supreme Court doctrine in the field of economic due process. Their
refusal to accept legislative declarations that the means used bear a
rational relation to permissible ends-promotion of public welfare--
creates a dilemma for the practicing attorney. Unless the content of
state due process is carefully studied to determine which approach the
courts of a particular state are prone to follow, predicting the outcome
of litigation in the due process field becomes highly precarious.
But several states have followed the lead of the Supreme Court in
demanding a demonstration of only a rational connection between means
and ends. The Delaware court in General Electric Co. v. Klein upheld
the non-signer provision as a reasonable exercise of the police power to
protect the good will of the manufacturers.2 5 The opinion expressly
stated that the means will not be questioned if it is reasonably debatable
that they bear a "reasonable relationship" to the ends sought.
The "fair trade" area with its minimum pricing difficulties has been
the predominant post-1950 problem of state courts in the price regulation
field. But barbering,- milk control,2  rental control 2' and cigarette
sales29 have also been subject to "judicial legislation." The barbers have
remained an invulnerable profession for price-fixing legislation.3 0  The
Arizona Supreme Court, citing Lochner v. New York3 1 as controlling,
stated:
Our difficulty is in finding 'any reasonable relationship to the
end sought,' that is the relationship between the minimum
price for barbering services and sanitation in the barbering
profession. Appellees have failed to indicate-to establish any
logical relationship whatsoever-the basis for their assumption
24 Id. at 291.
25 106 A. 2d 205 (1954-). Accord, Home Utilities Co. v. Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc., 209 Md. 610, 122 A. 2d 109 (1956) ; General Electric Co. v.
Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 1956 Mass. Advance Sheets 305, 132 N.E. 2d 652 (1956) ;
Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P. 2d 936
(1956).
26State Board of Barber Examiners v. Edwards, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 P. 2d
450 (1951), affd'., 76 Ariz. 27, 258 P. 2d 418 (1953) ; Haigh v. State Board of
Hairdressing, 76 R.I. 512, 72 A. 2d 674 (1950); Christian v. La Forge, 110 Cal.
App. 2d 738, 242 P. 2d 797 (1952).
2 7 Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E. 2d 692 (1951). Contra, Shiver v.
Lee, 89 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1956).
2 8 Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 109 A. 2d 640 (1954); Wagner v.
Mayor & Council of Newark, 42 N.J. Super. 193, 126 A. 2d 71 (1956).
2 9 Williams v. Hirsch, 211 Ga. 534, 87 S.E. 2d 70 (1955). Contra, May's
Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Commissioner, 242 Iowa 319, 45 N.W. 2d 245
(1950).
30 See supra note 26.
31 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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that the acts in question are not 'arbitrary and wholly un-
warranted' .. .2
In holding the New Jersey Rent Control Act constitutional, New
Jersey's high court followed Nebbla reasoning and the majority opinion
could well have been taken from Justice Douglas' opinion in the Day-
Brite case:
The finding of the Legislature is presumed to have the support
of facts known to it 'unless facts judicially known or proved
prelude that possibility'; generally, it is 'not the province of
a court to hear and examine evidence for the purpose of de-
ciding again a question which the legislature has already de-
cided'; its function 'is only to determine whether it is possible
to say that the legislative decision is without rational basis.'
Clark v. Paul Gray, 306 U.S. 583, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed.
1001 (1939). 3
The case can be explained on the basis that New Jersey courts have
followed the Supreme Court in other fields also. 4 Many states have
refused, however, to follow this view. Thus, Georgia has declared its
Unfair Cigarette Sales Act unconstitutional price-fixing and a violation
of due process since cigarette selling is not a "business affected with a
public interest."' 35 Indiana has held legislation controlling the price of
retail installment sales contracts unconstitutional, 6 and California re-
fused to permit regulation of dry cleaners' minimum prices."7
Although pre-1950 cases sustain the proposition that the fixing of
milk prices will be upheld, the Georgia court, defying all precedent,
struck down that state's Milk Control Act as a violation of state due
process.3" Prior cases in the jurisdiction upholding such legislation were
distinguished by allusion to the fact that they were not decided by a
"full bench" and thus the court did not feel bound by them. The case
was highlighted by an express refusal to follow the Nebbia doctrine
and a declaration that milk production was not a business affected with
a public interest since it was not devoted to a public use!
The language of the Oregon Supreme Court in General Electric
Co. v. Whale demonstrates the refusal of state courts to follow the
"rational nexus" test of the Supreme Court:
We can see no real and substantial connection between the
32 State Board of Barber Examiners v. Edwards, 72 Ariz. 108, 113, 231
P. 2d 450, 452 (1951).
33 Jamouneau v. Harner, 16 N.J. 500, 515, 109 A. 2d 640, 648 (1954).
34 Lane Distributors, Inc. v. Tilton, 7 N.J. Super. 349, 81 A. 2d 786 (1951);
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margets, 25 N.J. Super. 568, 96 A. 2d 706 (1953).
35 Williams v. Hirsch, supra note 28.
36 Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E. 2d
629 (1952).
3'7 State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436,
254 P. 2d 29 (1953).
38 Harris v. Duncan, supra note 26.
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nebulous theory that fixed minimum resale prices are necessary
to protect the goodwill of the trademark owner and the wel-
fare of the public. 
9
Thus we see that many state courts still adhere to (1) pre-1 9 3 4 con-
ceptions of the public interest, and (2) substantial nexus tests of pre-
Olsen federal cases in the price regulation area.
CONTROL OF COMPETITION By LICENSING
The persistence on the state level of an "anti-monopoly" core in
regard to licensing statutes and ordinances perpetuates and emphasizes
the basic dichotomy in due process. Although New State Ice Company v.
Liebmann ° has never been explicitly overruled, its content has been
drained by Nebbia and subsequent federal economic due process cases.
On the federal level, the general welfare as defined in Nebbia, has
been given precedence over anti-monopoly fears. This idea is best ex-
pressed as the freedom of the state to choose among economic policies:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and
in the absence of other constitutional restrictions, a state is
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.4
It is readily observed that control of competition by licensing by
state action is seldom objectionable under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The litigant must raise the state constitution as a bulwark against such
control. Licensing ordinances, permissible in general, are today being
invalidated as anti-competitive or oppressive under authority of federally-
defunct Liebmann.
The processions-law, medicine, optometry, dentistry and so forth
-have been especially prone to licensing restrictions because of their
evident close connection with the public welfare. But attempts to
preserve this "quasi-monopolistic" status for other fields of endeavor
have met with varied results. Barbering has been subject to licensing re-
strictions requiring training or experience before a license will be
granted." -  Although unsuccessful in attempting to regulate prices
which the barber may charge' 3 and the hours during which he may
operate,44 legislatures have been extremely successful in impressing the
39General Electric Co. v. Whale, 207 Ore. 302, 321, 296 P. 2d 635 (1956),
holding non-signer provision of Oregon Fair Trade Act unconstitutional.
40285 U.S. 262 (1932). The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
state statute which required the obtaining of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity before persons could engage in the manufacture or distribution of
ice in the state of Oklahoma.
41 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
42 Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W. 2d 530 (1949) ; State v. Sullivan,
245 Minn. 103, 71 NAV. 2d 895 (1955).
.13 Supra note 25.
44 City of Miami v. Shell's Super Store, 50 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1951).
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courts with the close connection between experienced barbers and public
health and welfare.
Photographer licensing statutes, since Harris v. State,45 have con-
tinued to meet with little success,4" as have dry cleaning licensing
requirements. In O/an Mills, Inc. v. Sharon, a city ordinance requiring
a license tax of $200 per month upon transient retail businesses was
held unduly oppressive and a hindrance upon lawful business opera-
tions." A Missouri statute was likewise held invalid, but on the basis
that it was discriminatory against non-resident photographers and a
burden upon interstate commerce.4" In both cases there was an
evident intent to protect the public from unscrupulous "fly-by-nighters,"
but the statutes were strictly interpreted to satisfy the economic views
of the courts. The most interesting of the recent photography cases is
State v. Gleason.4 9 The Montana court cited numerous pre-1950
cases holding photography licensing statutes unconstitutional, including
State v. Harris, which relied heavily on the 1927 case of Tyson & Bro.
v. Banton.50  Control over photography was termed "arbitrary and
capricious" as it is not a business "affected with a public interest."
Nebbia was discussed at great length, distinguished, and its full impact
rejected.
A Virginia statute regulating dry cleaning was invalidated on the
basis of unconstitutional discrimination and the lack of sufficient standards
to guide the agency controlling the subject of the legislation:
The subject matter of this legislation, the dry cleaning
business, requires no special skill or training. There is nothing
peculiar in the business which distinguishes it from ordinary
work and labor . . . It may have some indirect relation to
public health and safety, but it is not a sufficient menace to
either to require it to be controlled by an administrative
agency with absolute and unlimited authority.rJ1
State courts demonstrate a pronounced aversion to the protection
of special interest groups where there is no evident corresponding ad-
vancement of the public welfare. To invalidating the Illinois Plumbing
License Law, the Illinois Supreme Court declared:
. . . it is very clear it has not been demonstrated that the
bestowal of the special privilege rests upon material dis-
tinctions between the trade of plumbing and other trades
45 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E. 2d 854 (1940).
46 Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 364 Mo. 1089, 272 SAV. 2d
244 (1954); Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Sharon, 371 Pa. 609, 92 A. 2d 222 (1952);
State v. Gleason, 128 Mont. 485, 277 P. 2d 530 (1954).
47 Supra note 46.
48 Supra note 46.
49 Supra note 46.
50 273 U.S. 418 (1927).




or vocations affecting the public health, safety or welfare;
or that licensed master plumbers, as a class, are so circum-
stanced by the innate characteristics of their calling that the
special privilege in their hands is necessary and will bene-
ficially affect the public . . .52
The same basic philosophy of the Harris case runs through these
recent state court cases. The fear of the courts lies in the creation of
special interest groups with interests adverse to the general community.
To exclude persons from the opportunity to earn a living deprives
them of a fundamental right. The Watchmaking Act of 1945 was
declared unconstitutional by the Oklahoma court because:
The Act vests in the Board powers to make rules and regula-
tions which may deny some citizens their inherent right to
earn their livelihood in a private field of work, thus depriving
them of a valuable property right without due process of law. 53
Watchmaking was distinguished from barbering by the court's
declaration that for sanitary reasons licensing of barbers was justified.
Statutes and ordinances aiming at the destruction of existing busi-
nesses or prevention of new competition have been met with great
opposition by the state courts. A Tennessee municipal ordinance pro-
hibiting new gas storage tanks, thus effectively prohibiting construction
of additional filling stations in the municipality and preserving a
"monopoly" for existing stations, was declared void as discriminator,
and unduly restrictive of competition."' An Oklahoma municipal ordi-
nance requiring persons advertising the sale of distressed goods or dam-
aged merchandise to obtain a license and pay a license fee, passed with
the apparent intent to force the plaintiff out of business, was likewise
invalidated.25
PROHIBITION OF BUSINESS METHODS
Since 1950 the regulation of business activity by legislatures has
not appreciably decreased. In these times of business prosperity legisla-
tures have deemed it proper to place many and varied limitations on the
conduct of business activity. These limitations have met with little
opposition from federal due process. The United States Supreme Court
has not reverted to the days of Zdams v. Tanner,56 but has repeatedly
declared that federal due process requires only the demonstration of a
rational nexus between the legislative means and permissive goals. In
52 People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565, 584, 95 N.E. 2d 888, 899 (1950).
5 State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 207 Okla. 193, 196, 248 P. 2d 612, 615
(1952).
54 Consumer's Gasoline Stations v. City of Peelaski, 292 S.W. 2d 735
(Tenn. 1956).
55 City of Guthrie v. Pike & Long, 206 Okla. 307, 243 P. 2d 697 (1952).
Cf. Wilkins v. City of Harrison, 218 Ark. 316, 236 S.W. 2d 82 (1951).
56 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
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Beard v. City of Alexandria57 the court held a "Green River" ordinance
prohibiting unsolicited, door-to-door selling of merchandise or photo-
graphs constitutional as not violative of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rejecting appellant's due process argument
based on Adam v. Tanner"' and New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann"9 the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed, declared that improper
methods of conducting a legitimate business may be restricted or pro-
hibited in the public interest. The Court referred to Nebbia and the
dissenting opinion in Liebmann, concluding that "the problem is legislative
where there was reasonable bases for legislative action.""0
But it becomes immediately apparent upon even a cursory inspec-
tion, that all state courts have not followed the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of due process requirements. Despite the well
recognized presumption of validity of legislative acts, many state courts
following the substantive due process doctrine have invalidated legislative
acts on the grounds that the means selected by the legislature did not
bear a real and substantial relationship to the professed legislative goal.
These courts have consistently examined these statutes in the light of
the judges' own economic and social theories, using these theories to
pass on the statute's desirability and effectiveness. In many cases they
have ignored the professed legislative purpose and declared the "real"
purpose to be an improper one. The grounds for curtailment of legis-
lative regulation expressed in Adams v. Tanner.1 that the state legisla-
ture cannot unduly restrict the exercise of a private business, were fol-
lowed in the "Good Humor" cases and upheld in Frecker v. City of
Dayton.12  In this decision, the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated an
ordinance prohibiting the sale of ice cream on the city streets by stating
that the ordinance provided "no real and substantial relation to public
safety."0
63
This power assumed by the state courts to review the reasonableness
of particular statutes independent of any legislative declaration has been
reflected in many recent cases. In City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek
Canal Co. 4 the Nebraska Supreme Court held unconstitutional a city
ordinance requiring an irrigation company to transport all its water in
closed pipes rather than in open ditches, at greatly increased cost to the
company. The Court declared that police power actions of a munici-
pality were subject to review by the court to insure reasonableness and
57341 U.S. 622 (1951).
58 Sura note 56.
59 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
60 Supra note 57.
01 Supra note 56.
02 153 Ohio St. 14, 90 N.E. 2d 851; see discussion of "Good Humor" cases in
Paulsen, supra note 7, at 110.
03 Id., 20, 90 N.E. 2d at 854.
04 155 Neb. 723, 53 N.W. 2d 543 (1952).
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stated that to conform to due process requirements the exercise of the
police power must "be directed toward and have a rational relation
to protection of a basic interest of society . . . [and must be] really
designed to accomplish a legitimate public purpose."'
6
In the neighboring state of Iowa the supreme court invalidated a
statute prohibiting the use of the much-litigated trading stamps as vio-
lative of-among other grounds-the due process clause."c  The Court
required a "substantial relation to the object of public or general wel-
fare." A similar nexus was required by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in a 1955 decision holding invalid a statute prohibiting the manu-
facture of carbonated beverages with other than natural sweetening
agents.67 This court held that the exercise of police power was subject
to judicial review and that the "means employed must have a real and
substantial relation to the object to be attained . . . [and the] final
determination [of the existence of the above relation] is for the courts."6
The tendency of some judges to substitute their own opinions as to
the wisdom of the statute for that of the legislature may be seen in the
decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey invalidating a statute
prohibiting use of the corporate form by mortuaries in a legislative
attempt to elevate that occupation to the level of a profession.69 Here
the court refused to permit the legislature to exercise its intent in this
matter, because the court felt that the statute was so unreasonable as to
be an undue restriction upon private enterprise and property.
Another facet of this application of the substantive due process con-
cept to state regulatory actions is that the courts in applying this sub-
stantial nexus test will not allow themselves to be bound by the professed
legislative intent but will attempt to discover the presence of any hidden
motive behind the legislature's professed reasons for the act. Thus they
are enabled to decide the issue of the statute's desirability themselves.
A good example of this is found in the opinion of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Figura v. Cummins,7 0 wherein the court held unconsti-
tutional as violative of due process a statute prohibiting work in the
home on the processing of metal springs. The court stated that any
exercise of the police power must be reasonably adapted to obtain the
objective sought, but that:
The legislature cannot invoke police power on pretense of
promoting public interests, where actual objective of statute
is an interference with private business . . . it is the province
65Id., 731, 732, 53 N.W. 2d at 549.
66 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 65 N.V. 2d 410 (1954).
67 Cott Beverage Corp v.. Horst, 380 Pa. 124, 110 A. 2d 405 (1955).
68Id., 118, 110 A. 2d at 408.
69Trinka Services, Inc. v. State Board of Mortuary Science, 40 N.J. Super.
238, 122 A. 2d 668 (1956).
70 4 Ill. 2d 44, 122 N.E. 2d 162 (1954).
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of the court to determine that (if police power properly
exercised) issue.
Lower courts of New Jersey and New York in cases since 1950 have
also stressed the duty of the courts to look through the professed motive
of the legislature to the "real" purpose behind the statute.7
In a recent New York case the Court of Appeals held that a
statute prohibiting sale of evaporated skimmed milk in containers holding
less than ten pounds was unconstitutional as violative of due process.
72
Although the majority opinion impliedly followed the rational nexus
(as opposed to substantial nexus) test by invalidating the statute only
because no reasonable basis for its enactment was demonstrated, a
vigorous dissent, quoting the Nebbia case and Daniels v. Family Security
Life Ins. Co., showed that here the court had deviated from the de-
manding logic of the rational nexus test as some reasonable (rational)
relationship between the prohibition and public health and welfare could
be readily shown to exist.
Barbershops have always proved a fruitful source of litigation. In
City of Miami v. ShelPs Super Stores, the Florida court invalidated
municipal regulation of barbers' working hours by stating that, although
barbershops were subject to reasonable regulation, this was unreasonable
as an undue restriction on the right to do business.73 By the use of anal-
ogous reasoning the Utah high court held invalid a city ordinance
prohibiting advertising of prices for eyeglass prescriptions as not
bearing "sufficient relationship" to the police power.74 In the latter
case the court went deeply into the effect, desirability and eflicacy of
the legislation and independently determined that the law was not a
proper one.
75
REGULATION OF LABOR UNIONS AND UNION PRACTICES
In cases dealing with the regulation of labor and the practice of
inions, one might expect to find substantive due process a cogent force
pressing for invalidation of labor legislation in those courts where the
doctrine still flourishes. The history of due process in the labor field
has been an active one, for it was on this principle that Lochner v. New
York,78 Adair v. United States77 and their contemporaries were decided.
71 Germano v. Keenan 25 N.J. Super. 37, 95 A. 2d 439 (1953); Peoples
Dairy v. City of Lackawanna, 149 N.Y.S. 2d 392 (1956).
72 Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E. 2d 829
(1956).
73 50 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1951).
74 Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P. 2d 702 (1955).
75 Courts following such methods also insist on finding such a nexus when-
ever upholding regulatory legislation. Thus Idaho's high court in Rowe v. City of
Pocatello 218 P. 2d 695 (Idaho 1950), upholding the validity of a Green River
law, required, ". . . it must be reasonable and have some direct, real and sub-
stantial relation to the public object sought to be accomplished."
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1937 appears, however, to have been the turning point in the views of
the United States Supreme Court, regarding labor regulation connection
between means and ends. The famous case of West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, decided in that year, was the first of a still continuing line of
labor regulation cases in which the United States Supreme Court refused
to use the due process clause to curb the effectiveness of legislative
proposals." This has been true regardless of the nature of the legisla-
tion, i.e. whether it was to organized labor's gain or detriment.
But in the state courts there was a different development. Although
the doctrine of substantive due process, abandoned on the federal level,
is still very much in operation in the courts of many states, this does not
appear to be true in labor and union regulation litigation. In the labor
field after World War II, most state legislation was directed toward
curtailing union power by limiting the right to strike and by protecting
the "right to work." The judicial reasoning behind the due process
concept has been utilized here to insure the validity of such restrictive
legislation and no occasion appears where organized labor has successfully
used state substantive due process in attacking anti-union legislation.
This is in startling contrast to its application in business regulation cases.
One of the most effective anti-union devices utilized by legislatures
and upheld over due process objections has been the "right to work"
laws in the form of either statutes, provisions of the state constitution
or judicially-declared public policy. These enactments typically prohibit
membership in any union as a prerequisite to employment and corre-
spondingly ban any union shop agreements. In Local Union No. 519
v. Robertson" the Supreme Court of Florida upheld an injunction order
prohibiting picketing, the purpose of which was to force an employer into
a union shop agreement which would be violative of the public policy
of Florida, as the constitution and statute forbade any attempt to force
anyone to join a union. Of course, where the "right to work" provision
is embodied in the state constitution the state due process argument is
unavailable and the only recourse is to the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the United States Supreme Court applying its rational nexus test of
federal due process has cut off even this method of attacking such "right
to work" provisions by its decision in the Lincoln Federal Union case, in
which the Court in upholding "right to work" statutes declared that the
Fourteenth Amendment due process did not bar a state from following
whatever public policy it desired, so long as its acts fulfilled the rela-
tively simple requirement of a rational nexus.80 Where the "right
to work" is incorporated into a statute without an analogous constitu-
tional amendment, state substantive due process would be available to
labor to attack the statute, but to date no such attack has ever prevailed."1
TO 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See supra note 9.
77208 U.S. 161 (1908).
78 300 U.S. 397 (1937). See supra note 9.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
It would seem that any legislature which wished to enact anti-union
legislation in the form of a "right to work" statute need fear no due
process barrier. The only possible threat to such a statute lies not in
due process but in the possibility of federal supersedure by federal legis-
lation permitting union shop agreements in particular industries. The
recent case of Railway Employees v. Hansen,2 where the permissive
union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act were held by the Court
to supersede the Nebraska "right to work" law, demonstrates the effec-
tiveness though limited application of this principle.
Short of actual prohibition of strikes, which in the usual case
would be clearly unconstitutional, many legislatures have restricted the
lawful exercise of the right to strike and the right to picket. Although
here labor has tried unavailingly to use state due process, it has found
a more valuable defense in the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and in
similar provisions of state constitutions. In Gilbertson v. Culinary Al-
liance and Bartender's Union83 the Supreme Court of Oregon invali-
dated a statute prohibiting picketing unless those who were picketing
had been previously certified or recognized as the bargaining representa-
tives in the picketed business. The decision was based, however, on the
free speech requirement of the First Amendment and not on either
state or Fourteenth Amendment due process. In Construction and Gen-
eral Labor Union v. Stephenson84 the Texas court invalidated, on the
same grounds as in the Oregon case, legislation prohibiting picketing
except between employee and employer over a valid labor dispute. In
these picketing limitation cases where invalidity of the statute is based
on the violation of free speech, citation is repeatedly made to the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Thornhill v. Alabama and the Swing
case, both of which upheld the right of peaceful picketing."5
Although these two cases have been the basis of labor's attack on
statutes and judicial decisions restricting picketing, their impact has been
considerably diminished by two subsequent United States Supreme
Court decisions. In Building Serzice Employers International Jnion v.
Gazzam." and International Brotherwod of Teamsters v. Hankes7 the
Court consistently applied its rational nexus-due process concept and
7944 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
8O Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 537 (1949).
81 See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 114-5.
82 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
83282 P. 2d 632 (Ore. 1955).
84 225 S.W. 2d 958 (Tex. 1950).
85 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); American Federation of Labor
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
86 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
87 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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held that a state could ban peaceful picketing, either by statute or by
judicial decision reflecting the state's public policy, if the purpose of
that picketing were to compel employees to accept union membership
in violation of the state's "right to work" laws. These decisions
weakened the force of the Thornhill and Swing cases in those states
where "right to work" laws are in effect, in the face of the continued
unwillingness of the courts of those states to apply to labor regulation
the substantive due process applied to business regulation measures. An
example of this may be seen in the recent decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Chucales v. Royalty."8 In that case the court upheld an
injunction against peaceful picketing conducted by non-employees to
compel an employer to force the employees into the union, even though
the court felt it unnecessary to determine whether there existed in
Ohio any common law "right to work." The dissenting opinion of
Judge Zimmerman vainly attempted to instill life into the now by-
passed Thornhill and Swing cases.
8 9
Another aspect of legislative limitation on the right to strike is the
total abolition of that right in certain industries and institutions which
are considered by the legislature to be peculiarly responsible for the
public welfare. In Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Ass'n, 9
the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a statute prohibiting strikes
by public employees as not violative of either state or Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process. The court reasoned that the right to strike was not
absolute and universal and that, as these employees held a public trust,
they had no right to strike. In a similar Minnesota case the court held
constitutional a statute prohibiting strikes and lockouts in charitable hos-
pitals and substituting therefor compulsory arbitration. 9 1  This court
seemed to be applying the federal due process rational nexus rule when
it quoted with approval the words of a Michigan court:
We cannot pass on the soundness of social or economic
theories in the legislative mind when statutes of this kind are
enacted in the exercise of the police power. We cannot substi-
tute our judgment or opinions for those of the legislature as
to the expediency thereof.
It may be seen by these examples from the field of labor regulation
litigation, that the state courts have not exercised their doctrine of
substantive due process to upset what the legislatures have believed to be
desirable labor restrictions. Such legislation has on occasion been upset
88 164 Ohio St. 214, 129 N.E. 2d 823 (1955).
89 In non-picketing labor regulation cases where Thornhill and Swing are
not authorities, even the free speech contention will not necessarily be effective
to invalidate restrictive statutes. See e.g., Contlakis v. State, 268 S.W. 2d 192
(Texas 1954).
90 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W. 2d 228 (1952).
01 Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. Union, 241 Minn. 523, 64
N.W. 2d 16 (1954).
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but then only by invocation of the freedom of speech guarantees of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
CONCLUSION
The police power is the state's most potent device for safeguarding
the public good and protecting the liberty and opportunity of the
individual. By means of enactments designed to advance public health,
safety, morals and the general welfare the legislatures of our country,
as the governmental bodies most directly responsive to public sentiments,
have been able to preserve fully the benefits of our great social and
economic expansion. The legislative body is uniquely designed to inquire
into the desirability and practicability of proposed legislation. Re-
sponding to the public need, it can hold open hearings, require com-
mittee reports and otherwise investigate the attributes of proposals,
activity which no other governmental body is similarly or as effectively
equipped to do. Once such investigation has been made, a statute is
passed only by votes of at least a majority of the people's elected repre-
sentatives, thus insuring the expression of the public will.
The courts have an important role to play in the fulfillment of
legislation. It is the duty of the judiciary to protect the liberties of
our society from the license of those who would encroach upon them.
It is a vital role, 'but it is a role misconceived when the high courts of
the states abdicate this judicial function and wrongfully assume the
place of legislators, making independent decisions on desirability and
feasibility of legislation without open hearings, without committee and
expert reports and without all the other fact-finding devices of the
legislature. In 1934, an enlightened United States Supreme Court
recognized the evils inherent in this system of judicial review of the
merits of legislation under the guise of due process and began to with-
draw from that position until today it requires only the establishment of
a rational or reasonable nexus or connection between the means adopted
by the legislature and the announced, permissible legislative goal. If
this rational connection is found, the statute will be upheld regardless
of considerations of the legislation's efficacy or desirability. Some state
courts have followed the Federal Supreme Court's reinterpretation of
the content of the due process clause in interpreting similar clauses in
their own state constitutions, of which they are the final arbiters. But
in other states where more conservative social and economic theories
still hold sway, the courts have refused to follow the federal due pro-
cess doctrine and have clung to the older concept of substantive due
process. A most graphic illustration of this may be found in comparing
the treatment of state legislation compelling employers to allow reason-
able time-off pay for employees to cast their ballots on election day.
The United States Supreme Court found no difficulty in establishing a
rational nexus between the so-called "pay while voting" statute enacted
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by the Missouri legislature and the legislative goal of encouraging greater
use of the right of suffrage. 92 But in Illinois, conversely, the high court
of that state in invalidating a statute almost identical with that of
Missouri was unable to find a "real and substantial relationship" between
the legislation means and ends and held, therefore, that the due process
guarantee of Illinois had been violated.93 Here the two counts interpret-
ing similar statutes reached radically divergent results. State due process
is patently dissimilar to federal due process. Such terms as "rational
relationship" and "real and substantial relationship" are the touchstones
of difference.
Substantive due process is as alive and vigorous in state courts today
as it was in the federal courts thirty years ago. Many of our state
courts seem unwilling to abandon their stranglehold of power over
legislation for the less extreme but more reasonable position adopted
by the Federal Supreme Court. These courts have failed or are
unwilling to adopt the compelling logic of Mr. Justice Murphy in
Daniels v. Family Life Insurance Co.:
We cannot fail to recognize the requirement [of substantive
due process] as an argument for invalidity because this court
disagrees with the desirability of the legislation . . . We are
not equipped to decide desirability . . . The forum for the
correction of ill-considered legislation.is a response legislature.
94
If the goal of a democratic form of government is the effective
realization of the popular will, then the legislative body of that govern-
ment is the part functionally best equipped to give voice to that will.
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that states should be
free to formulate whatever economic regulatory policies they desire
but should be curtailed in any attempt to deprive the individual of his
essential liberties. This would seem to be the essence of democracy
and its promotion the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
The closer state courts co-ordinate their due process concepts with
those of the United States Supreme Court, the closer our nation will
come to the realization of the democratic ideal.
John 4. Hoskins
David .4. Katz
92 Day-Brite Lighting Co., Inc. v. State of Missouri 342 U.S. 421 (1951).
See supra note 12.
03 Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co. 6 Ill. 2d 152, 128
N.E. 2d 691 (1955).
94 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
